Clawback Sample Policies
>>> Best Practices: see this Investor Coalition Letter from Sept. 2015.
|Company||Triggers||Who is at risk?||What is subject to clawback?|
|CSC||Financial Restatement||Section 16 officers||Performance-based compensation that would not otherwise have been paid (tracking Dodd-Frank Law requirements). See text below.|
|Hasbro||Financial restatements - reflecting Dodd-Frank and SOX clawback rules||Executive officers and employees participating in fraud, etc.||Incentive-based compensation (including stock awards) over the three-year period before the accounting restatement.|
|Microsoft||Restated financial results, or awards increased due to executive misconduct||Executive officers, PAO||Performance-based compensation that would not otherwise have been paid|
|Wyeth||Financial restatement caused by executive fraud or misconduct||Executive officers and other key employees||Annual cash incentive/bonus awards and all forms of equity-based compensation.|
Sample Clawback Text
Recoupment Upon Restatement or Misstatement of Financial Results
If, in the opinion of the independent directors of the Board, the Company's financial results are restated [or materially mis-stated] due in whole or in part to intentional fraud or misconduct by one or more of the Company's executive officers, the independent directors have the discretion to use their best efforts to remedy the fraud or misconduct and prevent its recurrence. The Company's independent directors may, based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the restatement, direct that the Company recover all or a portion of any bonus or incentive compensation paid, or cancel the stock-based awards granted, to an executive officer. In addition, the independent directors may also seek to recoup any gains realized with respect to equity-based awards, including stock options and restricted stock units, regardless of when issued.
The remedies that may be sought by the independent directors are subject to a number of conditions, including, that: (1) the bonus or incentive compensation to be recouped was calculated based upon the financial results that were restated, (2) the executive officer in question engaged in the intentional misconduct, and (3) the bonus or incentive compensation calculated under the restated financial results is less than the amount actually paid or awarded.
In addition, the independent directors may take other disciplinary action, including, without limitation: (1) adjustment of future compensation of the executive officer, (2) termination of the executive officer's employment, (3) pursuit of any and all remedies available in law and/or equity in any country, and (4) pursuit of such other action as may fit the circumstances of the particular case. The independent directors may take into account penalties or punishments imposed by third parties, such as law enforcement agencies, regulators or other authorities. The independent directors' power to determine the appropriate punishment for the wrongdoers is in addition to, and not in replacement of, remedies imposed by such entities and is in addition to any right of recoupment against the Co-CEOs or CFO under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Sample Policies by SEC Reporting Companies:
The Board shall, in all appropriate circumstances, require reimbursement of any annual incentive payment or long-term incentive payment to an executive officer where: (1) the payment was predicated upon achieving certain financial results that were subsequently the subject of a substantial restatement of Company financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission; (2) the Board determines the executive engaged in intentional misconduct that caused or substantially caused the need for the substantial restatement; and (3) a lower payment would have been made to the executive based upon the restated financial results. In each such instance, the Company will, to the extent practicable, seek to recover from the individual executive the amount by which the individual executive's incentive payments for the relevant period exceeded the lower payment that would have been made based on the restated financial results. For purposes of this policy, the term "executive officer" means any officer who has been designated an executive officer by the Board.
Restatement; Formation of Committee
In the event of a restatement of the Company’s financial results (other than a restatement caused by a change in applicable accounting rules or interpretations), the result of which is that any performance-based compensation paid would have been a lower amount had it been calculated based on such restated results, a committee consisting of the non-management members of the Board of Directors (the “Independent Director Committee”) shall review such performance-based compensation.
Committee Determination; Compensation Subject to Recovery
If the Independent Director Committee determines that the amount of any such performance-based compensation actually paid or awarded to an executive officer (the “Awarded Compensation”) would have been a lower amount had it been calculated based on such restated financial statements (the “Actual Compensation”), and such executive officer engaged in fraud or intentional illegal conduct which materially contributed to the need for such restatement, then the Independent Director Committee shall, except as provided below, seek to recover for the benefit of the Company the after-tax portion of the difference between the Awarded Compensation and the Actual Compensation (such difference, the “Excess Compensation”).
In determining the after-tax portion of the Excess Compensation, the Independent Director Committee shall take into account its good faith estimate of the value of any tax deduction available to the executive officer in respect of such repayment.
The Independent Director Committee shall not seek recovery to the extent it determines (i) that to do so would be unreasonable or (ii) that it would be better for the Company not to do so. In making such determination, the Independent Director Committee shall take into account such considerations as it deems appropriate, including, without limitation, (A) the likelihood of success under governing law versus the cost and effort involved, (B) whether the assertion of a claim may prejudice the interests of the Company, including in any related proceeding or investigation, (C) the passage of time since the occurrence of the act in respect of the applicable fraud or intentional illegal conduct and (D) any pending legal proceeding relating to the applicable fraud or intentional illegal conduct.
Due Process Rights
Before the Independent Director Committee determines to seek recovery pursuant to this policy, it shall provide to the applicable executive officer written notice and the opportunity to be heard, at a meeting of the Independent Director Committee (which may be in-person or telephonic, as determined by the Independent Director Committee).
Manner of Repayment
If the Independent Director Committee determines to seek a recovery pursuant to this policy, it shall make a written demand for repayment from the executive officer and, if the executive officer does not within a reasonable period tender repayment in response to such demand, and the Independent Director Committee determines that he or she is unlikely to do so, the Independent Director Committee may seek a court order against the executive officer for such repayment.
For the purposes of this policy, (i) the term “executive officer” has the meaning given to that term in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, including any member of the Operations Executive Council and (ii) the term “performance-based compensation” means all bonuses and other incentive and equity compensation awarded to each of the Company’s executive officers, the amount, payment and/or vesting of which was calculated based wholly or in part on the application of objective performance criteria measured during any part of the period covered by the restatement.
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